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It may not be the case that many will be persuaded, by Bradley's argu
ments, into accepting the notion that truth has degrees, and that the only
genuine individual is the whole of reality. There remains, by the end, a
lingering suspicion that Russell's accusations of incoherence may not have
been as far off as Allard seems to suggest. But to swell the ranks of abso
lute idealists is not Allard's goal. What the book does achieve is to present
Bradley's metaphysics as far from abstruse, fanciful, meaningless, and eas
ily dismissed, but one rigorously grounded in a theory of logic. Avoiding
his holism and monism cannot be satisfactorily achieved by simply ignor
ing Bradley, but rather by engaging with his solutions to the problems in
the philosophy of logic and, to an extent, the philosophy of language. It
hardly needs to be stated that the natures of inference, judgment, and truth
are of central concern to modern philosophy. Re-engaging with Bradley in
the way that Allard does in this book not only affirms his position as one
of significant influence, but also provides insights and challenges still rel
evant and important for metaphysics and the theory of logic.

Evidence and Faith: Philosophy and Religion Since the Seventeenth Century, by
Charles Taliaferro. Cambridge University Press, 2005. xi + 457 pp. $75.00
(cloth), $29.99 (paper).
JAMES E. TAYLOR, Westmont College
This book is a volume in the Cambridge University Press series entitled
"The Evolution of Modern Philosophy," edited by Paul Guyer and Gary
Hatfield. Each volume of this series examines the historical development of
a current subdiscipline of philosophy from the standpoint of a contempo
rary practitioner. In this case, the subdiscipline is the philosophy of religion
and the practitioner is Charles Taliaferro, whom readers of this journal will
recognize as a philosopher eminently qualified to produce a work of this
sort. Taliaferro has combined his wealth of knowledge about the history of
modern and contemporary philosophy with his expertise as a careful and
creative philosopher to produce an excellent contribution to this series.
In the introduction Taliaferro articulates four main features of the phi
losophy of religion: it raises fundamental questions about human exis
tence and the nature of reality, draws on almost every area of philosophy,
is relevant to practical human concerns, and contains important issues ad
dressed by most modern philosophers. Throughout the book, he provides
numerous examples of each of these aspects of philosophical thinking
about religion.
Though the book is encyclopedic in scope, Taliaferro attempts to pro
vide it with an organizational unity by treating the concept of evidence,
broadly conceived and systematically characterized, as a reference point.
This and related concepts, together with philosophical argumentation
about religious issues, is the primary focus of the book, though Taliaferro
does include accounts of historical events, especially at the beginning of
most chapters, for some contextualization of the philosophical movements,
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theories, arguments, debates, and concepts he discusses. He says his audi
ence is philosophers interested in the philosophy of religion, whether they
specialize in this area or not. His main purpose is to provide these people
with an historical introduction to the field that explains how the modern
philosophical conversation about religion has unfolded and that illustrates
how these earlier philosophical contributions can continue to be impor
tant matters for serious philosophical reflection. Taliaferro's hope is that
his book will encourage more engagement, contribution, and collabora
tion in the current enterprise of philosophy of religion, which he observes
has broadened in scope recently to include nontheistic religious traditions.
Taliaferro's work provides resources for both critical and constructive phil
osophical reflection on a broad and diverse range of topics in religion.
Chapter one is about the Cambridge Platonists. Taliaferro discusses
them before their better-known predecessor Descartes because of their
transitional role and representative status. He focuses on Ralph Cudworth
and Henry More. Cudworth's appeal to the sovereignty of God's goodness
over God's will is characteristic of Cambridge Platonism. So also is More's
use of God-given but fallible human reason ("the candle of the Lord") to
argue for God's existence by means of the internal sign of the concept of
God (the ontological argument) and the external sign of design in nature
(the teleological argument). The Cambridge Platonists held that this use
of reason is both good and compatible with the authority of Scripture.
Their account of the relationship between mind and body mirrored their
view of God's relation to the universe. Spiritual and material realities are
mediated by a "Plastick Nature" (in the case of God and the cosmos) and
"plastic vital power" (in the case of the human soul and body) that makes
reason, freedom, and value possible. As philosophers who believed that
"inquiry into God's reality should be coupled with a genuine desire to
find God," they faced such challenges as Hobbesian scientific materialism,
religious skepticism about reason (such as that of Montaigne and Luther),
and philosophical alternatives to theism (such as atheism and deism).
In chapter two, Taliaferro turns to Cartesian philosophy of religion.
He remarks on both the influence and controversial nature of Cartesian
foundationalism and dualism in subsequent philosophy. He aims to en
courage a reassessment of Descartes's work for contemporary philosophy
of religion by arguing that some standard criticisms of Descartes's project
in the Meditations are not necessarily decisive. Most interesting to this
reviewer is Taliaferro's suggestion that Descartes's attempted solution to
the skeptical problem of the criterion is particularist rather than method
ist. He proposes that Descartes employs the method of doubt to discover
rather than demonstrate the role a trustworthy God plays in grounding his
knowledge. If Taliaferro is right, the Cartesian Circle problem is solved.
He also provides a sympathetic reading of Descartes's first causal argu
ment for God's existence in Meditation 3 and touches on the ontological
argument in Meditation 5 (Taliaferro's assumption that Descartes of
fers only two theistic arguments in the Meditations is an uncharacteristic
oversight on his part). Taliaferro also seeks to encourage further inquiry
into Descartes's argument for dualism. He turns the tables on a femi
nist critique of Cartesianism as devaluing the body by pointing out that
Descartes's emphasis on consciousness and rationality provide a firmer
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basis for universal rights than does an appeal to the material categories
of heredity, wealth, and brute material strength, which have historically
been a basis for discrimination.
The primary theme of chapter three is the early modern search for rules
of evidence. Though Taliaferro sees John Locke as the initiator of this effort,
he discusses the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes first to provide a context
for Locke's contribution. In reply to the charge that Hobbes's scientificallybased mechanistic materialism is atheistic, Taliaferro argues that the at
tention Hobbes pays to Scripture and theology and Hobbes's employment
of a cosmological argument make it more likely that Hobbes is a Chris
tian theist. He stresses Locke's agreement with Hobbes that knowledge
must be based on empirical evidence. Taliaferro sketches Locke's theory
of perception in preparation for discussing Berkeley's rejoinder and de
velopment of his subjective idealist alternative. This sets the stage for his
brief characterization of Jonathan Edward's similar account of the rela
tion between God and creation. After a passing glance at early American
philosophy of religion, Taliaferro moves on to develop the very different
views of Leibniz and Spinoza. Though a philosophical generalist, Leibniz
placed religious concerns at the center of his thought. As for Spinoza's
rationalistic and deterministic monism, Taliaferro resists the interpreta
tion of it as merely mechanistic materialism in religious garb because of
Spinoza's frequent admonition to love God. He says this makes Spinoza's
philosophy "profoundly religious." He says in summary that the philoso
phers of this chapter agree that tradition is limited apart from evidence
but disagree about the extent to which the Christian tradition need or can
be justified evidentially.
Humean philosophy of religion is the focus of chapter four. Taliaferro
contends that, in addition to Hume's skepticism about religious claims,
Hume also adhered to a "sweeping form of naturalism." In spite of the
skeptical conclusions about God, substance, self, and causation Hume
drew from his empiricist and evidentialist assumptions, he affirmed the
ultimate victory of our animal nature over skepticism when it comes to
ordinary (and even scientific) practice. Taliaferro provides a relatively
thorough examination of the criticisms of the design and cosmological ar
guments for God's existence Hume develops in his Dialogues on Natural
Religion. In place of the relatively narrow inductive approach to reasoning
about causes explicitly endorsed by Hume in the Dialogues and elsewhere,
Taliaferro urges the adoption of a comprehensive and cumulative method
of worldview comparison that emphasizes the extent to which a theory can
explain our observations. With this in mind, Taliaferro's suggested replies
to Philo's five objections to the design argument are forceful. Taliaferro's
preferred methodology also puts Hume's argument against the rationality
of belief in miracles in a different light. From a naturalistic perspective,
Hume's contention that the evidence against miracles always outweighs
the evidence for them makes sense. However, from a theistic point of view
it may be appropriate to weigh the evidence in such a way that Hume's
proportionalist evidentialism would permit belief in miracles. In spite of
his disagreements with Hume, Taliaferro characterizes him as a "deeply
humane philosopher," who strove to strike a balance between excessive
theoretical (and skeptical) detachment and unreflective practice.
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Taliaferro discusses Kant's contribution to the philosophy of religion in
chapter five. Before discussing Kant's critique of three classic theistic argu
ments, Taliaferro summarizes the revolutionary epistemological theory he
develops in the Critique of Pure Reason: though pure reason seeks knowl
edge of transcendent realities such as God, it is limited to a knowledge of
the world of our experience which is always, as Taliaferro aptly puts it,
"formatted" by means of our basic categories and concepts. So, according
to Kant, humans are not capable of proving that a perfect God exists on
the basis of the ontological, cosmological, or teleological arguments. Af
ter suggesting some defenses of these arguments against Kant's critique,
Taliaferro provides a clear and helpful summary of Kant's case for the
claim that it is rational for moral agents to postulate the existence of God
and an afterlife in order to make sense of their commitment to willing
the highest good of ideal happiness and virtue (which could exist only in
an afterlife and only with the assistance of a just and all-powerful God).
Taliaferro points out that, from the standpoint of this moral argument,
theists can contend that Bertrand Russell's commendation of moral action
in a godless world is problematic, whereas atheists like Albert Camus can
reject traditional morality on the basis of an agreement with Kant that
morality depends on God.
In chapter six, Taliaferro provides an overview of the debate between
naturalists and idealists about religion. He ends the chapter with a discus
sion of pragmatism, which he places between these positions. In the camp
of those engaged in a naturalistic critique of traditional theism are Mill
(who raised philosophical objections), Darwin (whose theory of biological
evolution challenged religious belief), and a handful of thinkers who criti
cized religion from a variety of social scientific perspectives (Feuerbach,
Marx, Weber, and Freud). In his discussion of idealism, Taliaferro focus
es on Hegel but touches on subsequent idealists as well, such as Bradley
(who argued that reality is ultimately a singular Absolute Spirit), McTaggart (who denied the reality of both God and time but affirmed the impor
tance of love), and the Boston personalists (whom Taliaferro likens to the
Cambridge Platonists in their resistance to materialism). Before taking up
pragmatism, Taliaferro discusses the late nineteenth- and early twentiethcentury debate over religious experience and the corresponding interest
in Eastern religious traditions and philosophies among Western thinkers.
Taliaferro's coverage of pragmatism includes Peirce (who emphasized the
practical and experiential side of religion), James (whose account of the reli
gious life in The Varieties of Religious Experience and reply to Clifford in "The
Will to Believe" are described and thoughtfully evaluated by Taliaferro),
and Dewey (whom Taliaferro believes takes "an approach to evidence and
religious faith that takes seriously both tradition and contemporary experi
ence and practice" in spite of his anti-supernatural orientation).
The title of chapter seven is "Continental and Feminist Philosophy of Re
ligion." Taliaferro characterizes continental philosophy as originating in a
nineteenth-century revolt against rationalism (in a broad sense that would
include not only Descartes but also the empiricists, Kant, and Hegel) that
does not devalue evidence but rather affirms a broader conception of it (so
as to include moods, for example). He begins his overview of continental
philosophy with Kierkegaard and restricts himself to Kierkegaard's view
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of faith and evidence. Turning to Nietzsche, Taliaferro underscores his Ki
erkegaard-like opposition to "the dispassionate inquiry of a philosophy
that invokes timeless universals" (p. 299) and his eventual championing of
the intellectual quest for that which is life-affirming. He then turns to the
twentieth century. In keeping with contemporary continental philosophy's
tendency to be "philosopher-centered" rather than "topic-centered" and
presumably because of the recency of this tradition (which makes selectiv
ity difficult), Taliaferro devotes each of three sections to four philosophers,
with mention of more minor figures in passing. He winds up the chapter
with a sympathetic reading and balanced critique of contemporary femi
nist philosophy of religion. The first set of four continental philosophers is
comprised by the "phenomenologists" (inspired by Husserl): Heidegger,
Sartre, Camus, and Beauvior. The second set includes Weil, Buber, Levinas
and Marcel. The final four are Gadamer, Ricoeur, Derrida, and Foucault.
In the last section, Taliaferro highlights the contributions to philosophy of
religion of three female feminist philosophers: Luce Irigaray, Grace Jantzen, and Pamela Sue Anderson.
Chapter eight is entitled "Five Major Moves." In it, Taliaferro address
es the move toward logical positivism, the move away from it, the move
to a Wittgensteinian approach to the philosophy of religion, the move to
a favorable philosophical conception of religious tradition, and the move
toward the inclusion of a plurality of religious traditions. After sum
marizing the Vienna Circle's verificationist criterion of meaningfulness,
Taliaferro reviews the consequences of this test for religious language,
traditional metaphysics, and continental (especially Heideggerian) phi
losophy. He then enumerates a plethora of problems with positivism
responsible for its downfall in most philosophical circles. Taliaferro de
scribes how the positivists were both fascinated and puzzled by Witt
genstein, who, in the Tractatus, both denied that religious language is
meaningful and yet also affirmed a reverent attitude toward the mystical.
It was the later Wittgenstein, however, whose emphasis on the ordinary
use of language provided non-traditional philosophers of religion with
an alternative to the positivist approach. As representatives of the move
toward a more positive philosophical stance toward religious tradition
(similar to the Cambridge Platonists), Taliaferro chooses to discuss the
Reformed Epistemologists Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff and
the anti-enlightenment philosopher Alasdair McIntyre. In the final sec
tion of this chapter, Taliaferro discusses the inclusion of nonmonotheistic
traditions in recent philosophical conversations about religion. He credits
Ninian Smart with inaugurating a cross-cultural philosophy of religion
that included Hinduism and Buddhism in addition to Judaism, Christian
ity, and Islam.
Taliaferro begins the last chapter ("Religions, Evidence, and Legitima
cy") by pointing out that The Encyclopedia o f Philosophy, which for many
years was the standard reference work in the field, was edited by Paul
Edwards, whose bias against religion was evident in the work. He goes
on to say that more recently, other resources much more favorable to the
philosophy of religion have superseded it (Robert Audi's Dictionary o f Phi
losophy and the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, in which much of the
philosophy of religion was edited by Eleonore Stump). These resources
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are a strong indication that John Searle is wrong to have recently implied
that no cultivated and interesting philosophers are currently discussing
religious issues. Taliaferro's survey of the current vibrant philosophy of
religion scene in the academy begins with the topic of science and religion.
He then observes that contemporary philosophy of religion involves a re
vival of the general approach to philosophy of religion taken by the Cam
bridge Platonists (with discussions of the divine attributes and the theistic
arguments). Taliaferro highlights the problem of evil in the philosophy
of religion as a special case study. He then identifies recent instances of
cordiality and friendship in some relationships between defenders and
critics of religious belief. He closes the chapter with a look at the role of
philosophy of religion outside the academy, especially in current debates
about the place of religion in the public square.
The book has two appendices. One of them, "A Guide to Further Study,"
lists centers and societies, journals, and books dedicated to the practice
of the philosophy of religion. The other, "Select Contemporary Philoso
phers," contains four tables listing philosophers (by specific topics) who
have done philosophical work in the general areas of (1) non-western and
non-traditional religions and movements, (2) divine attributes, (3) theistic
arguments, and (4) the problem of evil. Taliaferro also includes a select
bibliography. Only a person with a thorough mastery of the field could
have provided such complete and helpful lists - indeed, could have writ
ten such a valuable and useful book. Philosophers who practice or are
merely interested in the philosophy of religion will find this book to be a
rich and indispensable resource.

My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility, by John Martin Fischer. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006. Pp. 250 plus Index. $45.00 (hardcover)
STEWART GOETZ, Ursinus College
John Martin Fischer is without question one of the leading spokespersons
in contemporary philosophy of action for compatiblist views about free
will, determinism, and moral responsibility. My Way is a collection of firstrate essays by Fischer that have all, except for one (the Introduction), been
previously published in other places. The fourth essay in the collection
was co-written with Mark Ravizza, while the ninth was co-authored by
Eleonore Stump. In this review, I summarize some of the major ideas of
My Way and then critically interact with a few of them.
Fischer offers us the philosophical view he terms 'semicompatibilism':
determinism is incompatible with genuine metaphysical access to alterna
tive possibilities, while being compatible with moral responsibility (p. 133).
His primary motivation for defending semicompatilism is the belief that our
fundamental standing as free and morally responsible agents should not de
pend upon what science might or might not ultimately conclude about the
truth of causal determinism (p. 138). (Fischer also is concerned about prob
lems for our basic status as free and morally responsible agents that arise

